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Abstract. We define a new strategy for population games based on techniques from ma-
chine learning and statistical inference that is essentially uninvadable and can successfully
invade (significantly more likely than a neutral mutant) essentially all known memory-one
strategies for the prisoner’s dilemma and other population games, including ALLC (always
cooperate), ALLD (always defect), tit-for-tat (TFT) [7], win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) [11],
and zero determinant (ZD) strategies, including extortionate and generous strategies. We
will refer to a player using this strategy as an information player and the specific imple-
mentation as IP0. Such players use the history of play to identify opponent’s strategies and
respond accordingly, and naturally learn to cooperate with each other.
1. Introduction
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) [16] has a long history of study in evolutionary game theory
[10] [12] and finite populations and is usually defined by a game matrix ( R ST P ) with T > R >
P > S and often 2R > T +S. A special case known as the donation game is given by T = b,
R = b − c, P = 0, S = −c, with 0 < c < b. The discovery of zero determinant strategies
by Press and Dyson [14] has invigorated the study of the prisoner’s dilemma, including
the evolutionary stability of these strategies in population games and their relationship to
and impact on the evolution of cooperation [10] [18] [6] [5] [2] [1] [17]. In a tournament
emulating the influential contest conducted by Axelrod [3], Stewart and Plotkin show that
some zero determinant (ZD) strategies are very successful; Adami and Hintze [1] have shown
that ZD strategies are evolutionarily unstable in general, but can be effective if opponents
can be identified and play can depend on the opponent’s type (including versus itself). In
particular, how a strategy fares against itself becomes crucial in population games.
Many strategies for the prisoner’s dilemma have been studied in a huge array of contexts,
and it is often found that simpler strategies can beat more complex strategies (e.g. TFT
won early repeated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments [3]). It has long been common to for-
mulate PD strategies as first-order Markov processes, i.e. whose next move depends only
on the last game outcome. This can be described by a vector of four probabilities denoting
the probability that the player will select to cooperate (C) based on the previous round
of play: (Pr(C|CC), P r(C|CD), P r(C|DC), P r(C|DD)); we will refer to this as a strategy
vector. Press and Dyson suggested that such first-order Markov strategies, called memory-
one strategies, can dominate more complex strategies; specifically, that using higher-order
history does not help versus a ZD (first-order Markov) strategy [14]. Stewart and Plotkin
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have also argued that a generous ZD strategy can be robust against any invading strategy
(i.e. no invader can achieve better than neutral fixation probability) [18] under a set of as-
sumptions including weak selection. In population games, Adami and Hintze have indicated
that tag information identifying which players are of the opposing type can significantly
increase evolutionary success [1]. They also suggested that it is possible to recognize an
opponent’s strategy from the history of play. Can information from past history – ignored
by a first-order Markov strategy – improve evolutionary success?
1.1. Information Players. We refer to a player that uses such information (history or some
sort of tag indicating strategy) as an information player (IP). Formally, whereas a first-order
Markov player’s next move is conditionally independent of past history given the current
game outcome (zero mutual information), an information player’s next move depends on past
history (shares non-zero mutual information given the current game outcome). Specifically,
we investigate whether machine learning can yield useful information from past history, both
to identify opponents and to infer their likely behavior.
Our approach recapitulates long-standing principles, for example as summarized by Sun
Tzu’s The Art of War :
The general who wins the battle makes many calculations in his temple be-
fore the battle is fought. The general who loses makes but few calculations
beforehand.
Know your enemy and know yourself, find naught in fear for 100 battles.
...what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.
One defends when his strength is inadequate, he attacks when it is abundant.
– Sun Tzu, The Art of War
In particular, we explicitly define a strategy that utilizes the history of play to determine
the strategies of other players (assuming no strategy identifying tag is supplied), and uses
these determinations to optimize its subsequent moves. We call this specific implementation
of an information player IP0, which embodies the principles above as follows:
• Know your enemy. Rather than seeking to maximize its score, IP0 initially seeks
to maximize its information about another player’s strategy vector. For the first
10 rounds vs. a specific player, IP0 selects its plays, either cooperate (C) or defect
(D), solely to maximize its information yield about the other player’s strategy vector
probabilities. We refer to this as the information gain phase. The four probabilities
are estimated from these rounds of play and are continually refined in subsequent
rounds.
• Know yourself. Each IP0 individual attempts to identify whether each other other
player is also IP0, based purely on whether it appears to “play like me” (choose the
same moves an IP0 would have chosen). In particular, the information gain phase
produces a unique pattern of play, that can be quickly recognized (within 3 - 10
moves), even in the presence of random noise (randomly flipped moves). Note however
that each IP0 player acts completely independently; different IP0 in a population share
no information and do not communicate.
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• Attack the enemy’s strategy. In subsequent rounds, each IP0 seeks to maximize its
own average score (and by extension that of all IPs in the population) vs. that of
the opposing player type. Specifically, it always seeks to cooperate with other IP0
individuals; versus the opposing type, it chooses the optimal strategy vector based
on its estimate of the opposing type’s strategy vector. As rounds proceed, each IP0
continues to update its estimate of opponents probabilities, and adjusts its play as
needed to maximize its average score difference.
• One defends... one attacks... We will see that IP0 naturally switches effective strat-
egy depending on the proportion of IP0 in the population, and the opponent strategy.
Commonly, IP0 initially cooperates with the opposing type, when IP0 is in the mi-
nority, and later defects against the opposing type, when IP0 is in the majority.
In this paper we test our approach on a variety of traditionally successful strategies and
ZD strategies, but our results are not limited to such opponents, nor for that matter to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We also allow for errors in play, described by an ambient noise
parameter ǫ since this provides a greater variety of strategic interactions between many
classical players such as TFT and WSLS.
1.2. ZD strategies. Stewart and Plotkin have shown that for weak selection the class of
generous zero determinant strategies is evolutionarily robust in the space of memory-one
players and that these robust ZD strategies can invade other (extortionate) zero determinant
strategies [18]. We will refer to these robust strategies as “ZDR” throughout this paper, and
will use as one key example the ZDR (χ = 1
2
) case, which represents the best of the class
that Stewart and Plotkin designate as “Good and robust” [18]. We will refer to extortionate
ZD strategies as “ZDχ”; see Methods for details.
2. Results
2.1. One defends when his strength is inadequate, he attacks when it is abundant.
The long run evolutionary fitness of a player of type I is determined by its mean stationary
score relative to that of players of the opposing group G, specifically
(1) SI − SG =
m− 1
N − 1
SII +
N −m
N − 1
SIG −
m
N − 1
SGI −
N −m− 1
N − 1
SGG
where m is the number of players of type I in the population; N−m is the number of players
of type G; SII , SIG, SGI , SGG are the average scores of players of type I with each other vs.
with a player of the opposing group, and the opposing group player’s average scores with a
player of type I vs. with another group player. An optimal strategy for player I is simply
one that maximizes SI−SG. Note that this is strongly dependent on the population fraction
f = m/N ; for small f (m≪ N), SI − SG is dominated by the SIG, SGG terms; whereas for
large f it is dominated by the SII , SGI terms. Note that the two-player game considered
by Press & Dyson is a subcase of this spectrum; specifically, the only case (N = 2) where
there is only one possible value of m (m = 1) and SI − SG reduces to the trivial form
SI − SG = SIG − SGI . Note carefully that IP0 attempts to maximize the stationary score
difference, in simulation we use the actual values from the prisoner’s dilemma matrix, and
do not assume that the payoffs are the stationary payoffs (in contrast to e.g. [19]).
Figures 1 and 2 show SI − SG as a function of population fraction f , for a variety of
established strategies, computed from their long-term (stationary) scores [14]. Several basic
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conclusions emerge from these plots. First, no one strategy is optimal against all opponents:
for example, at low population fractions, ZDR is optimal against WSLS, whereas ALLC is
optimal against ZDχ. Second, even against a single opponent, typically no one strategy is
optimal at all population fractions. For example, against WSLS, ZDR scores better than
ALLD at low population fractions, but worse than ALLD at high population fractions. Third,
even at a single given point on such a score plot, it is commonly not optimal for players of type
I to play the same strategy vector with each other as with the opposing players of type G. For
example, at high population fractions, playing ALLD vs. the opponent (ensuring SGI ≤ P )
while playing ALLC with each other (yielding SII = R) maximizes SI−SG → R−P . Hintze
and Adami have posited a theoretical strategy, Conditional Defector (ConDef) for achieving
this: assuming that it is given the correct tag for the type of each player, ConDef cooperates
with other ConDef players and defects vs. players of the opposing type [1]. (They also
defined a tag-based ZD player ZDt that cooperates with other ZDt players and plays a ZD
strategy against the opposing type). Fourth, it is striking that even traditionally successful
strategies such as WSLS and ZDR are vulnerable to invasion, because at low population
fractions an invader can achieve parity (neutral selection) vs. these strategies, while at high
population fraction it can gain a crushing advantage over them (by switching to what is
essentially ConDef).
Taken together, these results suggest that information gleaned from the history of previous
game outcomes can yield several basic advantages for choosing moves in the subsequent
rounds: player I can infer which individual players are “like it” (i.e. also of type I) vs.
“enemy” (i.e. of type G; we refer to this as identification); player I can estimate player G’s
strategy vector, enabling it to choose the optimal counter-strategy; player I can estimate
what fraction of the population consists of players of type G. All of these are crucial for
maximizing SI − SG.
2.2. Know Your Enemy and Know Thyself. That identification is useful highlights
a crucial question: in the absence of strategy-indicating tags, can an information player
determine the identity of other players (I vs. G) rapidly and accurately, purely from the
past history of how they played against it in previous games? IP0 begins its play versus
any other player with an information gain phase (infogain, see Methods). This phase seeks
to collect maximal information about the other’s strategy vector, and at the same time
estimates the likelihood that the other is also an IP0 player; specifically whether it is also
playing by the infogain rule. Thus the infogain phase achieves self-recognition by a most
basic principle, “does the opponent play similarly?” (i.e. choose the same moves that IP0).
This approach can rapidly discriminate non-IP0 players. In the absence of random noise
(move errors), it is trivial: the very first move that doesn’t match the expected infogain
move exposes the opponent to be not IP0, and this typically occurs within the first 3 moves.
To make this more challenging, we assessed the effect of random noise, by randomly flipping
each player’s move with probability ǫ. Then IP0 must assess observed mismatches prob-
abilistically, e.g. by computing the probability that the observed mismatches could have
arisen from another IP0 player due solely to random noise (see Methods). This can achieve
good discrimination, at the cost of a few extra rounds. Figure 3A shows Receiver-Operator
Characteristic (ROC) curves for discrimination of non-IP0 players (vertical axis, True Pos-
itives) vs. IP0 players (horizontal axis, False Positives) after 10 rounds of play under 5%
noise. Corner strategies such as ALLC and ALLD were identified perfectly (i.e. 100% TP
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Figure 1. Mean score difference SI −SG as a function of the invader’s popu-
lation fraction, for several different invading strategies (I=ALLC, ALLD, ZDR,
ConDef, ZDt) vs. several different resident strategies: TFT (A, B); ALLC (C,
D); ALLD (E, F).
at 0% FP), while the most difficult case (ZDR) was identified with 98% accuracy at a false
positive rate of only 10%. Concretely, for N = 100 players, a single IP0 player invading a
resident ZDR population could confidently identify 97 of the 99 ZDR players, while having
a 90% probability of recognizing any new IP0 player within just 10 rounds of play.
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Figure 2. Average fitness difference SI − SG as a function of the in-
vader’s population fraction, for several different invading strategies (I=ALLC,
ALLD,ZDR, ConDef, ZDt) vs. several different resident strategies: WSLS (A,
B); ZDR (C, D); ZDχ (E, F).
To summarize the speed of this process and its sensitivity to noise, we computed a standard
measure of discrimination accuracy (AUC, Area Under the Curve, the integral of the ROC
curve) for the hardest case (ZDR), and plotted it as a function of number of infogain rounds
and for different levels of noise (Figure 3B). At zero noise, perfect discrimination (AUC=1)
was achieved after just 3 rounds; with up to 10% noise, AUC accuracies of 87-98% were
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attained after just 3 rounds. Even at 10% noise, AUC accuracy of greater than 97% was
attained after 10 rounds.
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Figure 3. Accuracy of information gain phase. Left: ROC for ǫ = 0.05
and 10 infogain rounds. Vertical axis: true positives, Horizontal axis: false
positives. ZDR is the hardest strategy to recognize among those tested. Right:
AUC for IP against ZDR for ǫ = 0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1.
2.3. Find Naught in Fear for 100 Battles: Empirical Fixation Probabilities. To
assess whether IP0 can invade other strategies and resist invasion, we conducted a large
number of simulations of IP0 versus other strategies for the prisoner’s dilemma (Table 1).
Starting with m = 1 player of one type invading N−1 players of a second type, we performed
simulations as described in Stewart and Plotkin, i.e. with the exponential imitation dynamic
(and β = 1), donation game matrix, and N = 100 population size [18] (see Methods). In
each round of play, every individual plays every other individual, moves are randomly flipped
with probability ǫ = 0.05, and fitness is computed as total payout versus all other players.
Note that no tag (type) information was supplied about any player. Instead, each player was
assigned a unique integer ID value, which other players could use to track their history of
play vs. that specific player, and all players were notified of the ID of any player replaced by
the imitation dynamic (but again given no information about the type of the new player).
Table 1 lists the fixation odds ratio of each strategy versus each other strategy, determined
empirically via simulation (specifically, it gives the ratio ρ/ρneutral, where ρ is the observed
fixation probability, and ρneutral = 1/N is the fixation probability expected under neutral se-
lection; hence a table value of 1.0 indicates neutral selection). In no case was IP0 successfully
invaded by any other strategy. By contrast, IP0 is able to invade all other strategies, with
a fixation probability greater than a neutral mutant (ρ > ρneutral), and in all cases is either
the best or second best opponent (i.e. largest or second largest value in each column). In
the language of the Moran process, IP0 has higher relative fitness versus all other strategies,
and as a resident strategy is evolutionarily robust (defined as ρ ≤ ρneutral for all possible
invaders [13]) tested. Qualitatively similar results hold for other population sizes N ≈ 30
or greater. We also simulated with a Moran selection rule, where each round one player
is selected to reproduce proportionally to fitness and one player is selected to be replaced
uniformly at random [9] [12]. Results were similar. Also, results for simulations using the
standard prisoner’s dilemma score matrix (as in [14], instead of the donation game matrix)
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IP0 ALLC ALLD TFT WSLS ZDR ZDχ
IP0 58.10 5.50 43.60 1.96 16.30 51.01
ALLC 0 0 49.48 0 21.14 54.78
ALLD 0 59.38 0 0.05 0 0
TFT 0 0 3.68 0 0 9.74
WSLS 0 34.72 0 7.11 0.32 21.16
ZDR 0 0 0.86 24.07 0 27.55
ZDχ 0 0 1.61 0 0 0
Table 1. Fixation odds ratios ρ/ρneutral of a single row player invading a
population of N − 1 = 99 column players, with an ambient error rate of
ǫ = 0.05. At least 10,000 simulations were performed for each pair of types.
For IP0, p-values for the null hypothesis of neutral fixation is p = 5 × 10
−10
for ALLD and p < 10−26 otherwise.
are qualitatively similar. In principle, IP0 should excel in any asymmetric game with similar
updating rules (it is not designed specifically for a particular game or updating rule).
These values reveal much about how IP0 competes against other players. IP0 is nearly
as effective against ALLC as ALLD is, and quickly learns to exploit ALLC, but has a
slightly smaller fixation probability because of the information gaining stage. IP0 also fares
well against ALLD, behaving much like TFT in that it cooperates with other (identified)
IP0 individuals and defects against ALLD. Outcomes versus ALLD are sensitive to initial
population proportion. An invading subpopulation of 10 IP0 has an empirically computed
fixation probability of ρ ≈ 0.5 (versus a neutral fixation probability of ρ = 0.10).
Versus TFT, IP0 does not fall prey to the mismatches in due to errors that TFT is prone
to [12], but may suffer versus TFT in the information gaining period (and so does not fare
quite as well as ALLC, but has a higher chance to invade than all other players). Among all
strategies in our simulations, IP0 is the only strategy to have a fixation probability greater
than a neutral mutant (ρneutral = 1/N) versus all other strategies, and the only strategy
resistant to invasion by all other strategies.
In general, the ability of IP0 to invade other strategies appears to correlate with its fitness
difference vs. those strategies at low population fractions (i.e. m ≈ 1, see Figs. 1 - 2). For
those where IP0 can immediately achieve a strongly positive stationary score difference (e.g.
vs. ALLC, TFT, ZDR, ZDχ), it can invade with high fixation probabilities. For those where
IP0 is confined to neutral score for low values of m (e.g. vs. ALLD, WSLS), its fixation
probabilities are lower.
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Smaller values of ǫ make TFT more challenging to infiltrate, however at ǫ = 0.01 the
fixation probability of an IP0 mutant is still 8 times the neutral probability. This dependence
is due to the relatively large number of rounds needed for TFT to reach its stationary
distribution versus some other strategies, and this prolongs the time needed to invade an
ambient population of TFT players. IP0 is apparently uninvadable by TFT at ǫ = 0.01 and
N = 100, but was invaded once in 10017 simulations for N = 40.
2.4. Robust Zero Determinant Strategies. Stewart and Plotkin have outlined a series
of assumptions under which ZDR strategies are robust to all other IPD strategies [18]. One
implicit assumption in this argument is that players’ type cannot be identified, either by
a tag as described by Adami and Hintze [1] or by statistical inference from the history of
play as performed by IP0. As shown in Fig. 2C, ZDR strategies are vulnerable to invasion
by such information players, because the ZDR can at best guarantee neutral selection i.e.
(SI − SG = 0) vs. the IP invader at low population fractions (m ≈ 1), whereas when the
IP invader is in the majority it can gain a strong selective advantage (SI − SG ≫ 0). In
simulations, we found that a tag-based IP (ConSwitch) invades ZDR at much higher than
neutral fixation probability (ρ/ρneutral ≈ 1.6, see Fig. 4), and that IP0 achieved better
than neutral invasion success against ZDR for χ ≥ 0.8 even at zero noise (ǫ = 0). We
wish to emphasize that our IP0 implementation clearly falls far short of the theoretical IP
performance limit as indicated by ConSwitch. This mirrors what we saw at low population
fractions in Fig. 2B, where IP0 falls short of the perfect (neutral) score that ConSwitch
attains vs ZDR. This shortfall is due to the “cost” of the infogain phase in the current IP
implementation, which indicates a clear direction for improvement of our IP implementation.
A second factor that renders ZDR easily prone to invasion by IP0 is the effect of noise.
Even low levels of noise (e.g. ǫ = 0.01) enabled IP0 to invade ZDR at better than neutral
fixation probability at all values of χ (Fig. 4). In general, noise appears to degrade the
performance of Markov players such as ZDR even more than it degrades the performance
of IP0. Specifically, noise reduces ZDR’s ability to cooperate with itself (i.e. the fraction of
ZDR-ZDR game outcomes that are CC), and hence its stationary score (see Fig. 4), more
than it reduces IP0’s ability to cooperate with itself (because its self-recognition algorithm
is robust to noise, and its self-strategy – ALLC – is less affected by noise than ZDR is).
3. Discussion
For zero noise, weak selection, no history, and stationary payouts, the robustness results
of Stewart and Plotkin are not contradicted by our empirical results (likewise for the strong
selection results in [20]). Our results, however, indicated that with tagging of player strate-
gies, robust zero determinant strategies can be invaded for non-weak selection and no noise.
This should not be surprising from Figures 1 and 2. ZDR is not able to generally able invade
IP0 nor the variety of strategies that IP0 is able to invade. For instance, ZDR is neutral
versus e.g. ALLC (with ǫ = 0), whereas IP0 can invade ALLC easily at the same level of
noise. Note that whereas IP0 is always able to invade ZDR strategies, even at zero noise,
neither ZDR strategies nor any of the other strategies we’ve tested is ever able to invade IP0.
Fixation probabilities for zero-determinant strategies were studied by Stewart and Plotkin
[19] in the case of weak selection. Our results indicate IP0 is robust to invasion against all
the opponents in Table 1. That this generally holds is simply a consequence of the fact that
IP0 specifically chooses to maximize the stationary score difference with its opponents while
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Figure 4. Invasion success of IP versus ZD strategies (log-scale, fixation
probability of an IP0 invader, normalized so 1.0 = neutral selection) for dif-
ferent levels of noise ǫ. The top plot is extortionate (κ = 0 while the lower
three plots have κ = B − C so the ZD strategies are cooperative [19]. As the
value of χ increases, the fixation probability of IP increases. As the amount
of noise decreases, the fixation of our implementation of IP approaches the
neutral fixation. With no noise, an IP player can empirically invade ZDR at
twice the neutral probability (20 out of 1000 simulations with the information
phase replaced with tags).
obtaining the cooperative payout when playing itself. Therefore, once the information gain
phase is over, IP0 will fixate at least as well as a neutral mutant strategy, and typically much
more often. For IP0 to be invaded or resisted better than a neutral mutant, the opponent
strategy must somehow exploit the manner in which IP attempts to gain information (per-
haps by mimicing IP0 to be misidentified as another IP0 player), or the information gain
phase must be too costly (for instance in a very small population).
We have shown that information strategies utilizing the history of play can be highly
effective infiltrators and are very robust against invasion in population games. IP0 is able
to invade essentially any memory-one strategy for a reasonably large population (close to
neutral in the worst cases, vastly dominant in others), with greater success under greater
ambient error probabilities (at least in the range we tested, 0ǫ0.1). We conjecture that for
sufficiently large populations IP0 is robust to invasion against all memory-one strategies, and
also that IP0 is neutral or better as an invader of memory-one strategies (with exceptions
occurring mainly for small ambient noise and/or weak selection).
While we have discussed our results in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma, IP0 is
effective in principle in all population games without significant modification. For any
game matrix, IP0 will still identify other players’ strategies and maximize the difference
in stationary payout. Information players should fare well in a variety of other contexts,
including asymmetric games and population games on graphs.
We have not attempted to optimize the relative length of the IP0 information gain phase,
and it is clear in some contexts that finer-tuned play is possible, particularly against generous
ZD strategies for the donation game. In particular, very small populations may require a
more refined information gain phase. We have also not attempted to optimize against other
“theory of mind” players that may be able to play effectively against our implementation of
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an information player. The implementation does attempt to recognize players that are able
to change their strategies and respond accordingly, and similar countermeasures could be
employed. At some point, for the prisoner’s dilemma, play between two players degenerates
into an ultimatum game [14], and uncooperative and/or manipulative players could simply
be systematically defected against.
3.1. History of Play. In [19], Stewart and Plotkin argue that (under weak selection, in
the absence of ambient noise, and using stationary score as fitness) that one need only
consider memory-one strategies in population games to determine evolutionary robustness
(extending a similar idea of Press and Dyson for two-player games). Like Adami and Hintze,
we find that the history of play allows for highly effective non-memory-one strategies. The
assumption that each player has a unique identifier is operationally equivalent to providing
in each pairing the history of play of the pair to each player before they select their move,
allowing for a personalized response, e.g. the inference of strategy identifying tags. Note
carefully that we are not assuming that the history of interactions with other (third-party)
players is available to each pair, just the history of play of the specified pairing. Our results
show that it is not generally sufficient to only consider memory-one players in population
games.
Another important distinction of IP0 is that the individual information players cannot be
aggregated as all having the same stationary score with each other. Indeed, the IP0 subpop-
ulation is more like a quasispecies with several closely related variants, with each information
player potentially identifying a different subpopulation of information players players and
having inferred slightly different conditional probability vectors for non-IP0 strategies (the
information players share no information explicitly). Accordingly, we computed fixation
probabilities empirically from large numbers of simulation and cannot rely on the typical
analytic formulas for two-type population games (death-birth processes). For larger popu-
lations, the deviation from the theoretical values (from the stationary payouts) should be
small, since IP0 can quickly approach stationary payoffs.
In principle, information strategies could be generalized to detect memory-m players using
m-rounds of history to form their strategies, such as Tit-for-Two-Tats. This may require
a longer information gaining stage, but it is possible to first attempt a memory-one model
and use information metrics to determine if an alternate model is required [8]. We leave this
topic, and the issue of effective counter-strategies to IP0 and other information players, for
future work.
3.2. MaRS. After circulating an initial draft of this manuscript, the authors were made
aware by Christian Hilbe of a strategy known as MaRS (mimicry and relative similarity),
created by Fischer et al [4]. Like IP0, an individual playing the MaRS strategy is an in-
formation player and uses a unique identifier for each opponent along with the history of
play to formulate a counter-strategy, but unlike IP0 uses principles of mimicry and imitation
to emulate aspects of the classical strategies such as TFT and WSLS. This leads to the
emergence of cooperation by pushing non-cooperative opponents toward extinction.
We attempted an implementation of MaRS, which we call MaRS∗ to indicate potential
differences from the implementation in [4], and simulated population games versus IP0 and
the other strategies in Table 1. With no noise, MaRS∗ was able to invade TFT (59x neutral),
ZDχ (35x), ZDR (1.5x) and is approx. neutral versus ALLC and WSLS; IP0 invades TFT
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at 54x, ZDχ at 71x, ALLC at 61x, and ALLD at 7x. Both MaRS
∗ and IP0 are robust to
invasion by the tested strategies above, however one additional test strategy GTFT (generous
tit-for-tat) was able to invade MaRS∗ with a greater than neutral probability (≈ 600 out of
10000, 6-fold greater than neutral). Interestingly MaRS∗ is able to invade GTFT at about
twice the netural probability, while IP0 is unable to invade (0.8x) or be invaded by GTFT
in the same context. This indicates that MaRS∗ is qualitatively more similar to GTFT than
IP0.
At the 5% noise level, MaRS∗ is able to invade ALLC at 46x and ZDχ at 3x, and is invaded
by TFT (3x neutral) and ZDR (18x netural). Compare to Table 1 where IP0 is robust to
invasion and an effective invader of all the test strategies. Neither MaRS∗ nor IP0 is able to
invade the other at 0% or 5% noise.
Ostensibly the performance of MaRS∗ and IP0 are somewhat similar for the prisoner’s
dilemma in the absence of noise, which can be understood by the work of Press and Dyson
[14]. Maximizing the long run (stationary) payoffs of the prisoner’s dilemma often necessi-
tates some degree of coordination for various pairs of opponents by the nature of the payoffs
of the game. While MaRS∗ cooperates with opponents that exhibit a similar history of play
by design, IP0 only cooperates if doing so rewards cooperation stationarily, and is not tied in
principle to either the prisoner’s dilemma or strategic scenarios that benefit from mimicry or
other coordinated modes of play. For the prisoner’s dilemma, the principles underlying IP0
sometimes align with those of MaRS∗, which indicates that IP0 too induces the emergence of
cooperation. But the intentionality is different, since IP0 cares not about cooperation, only
in maximizing relative stationary output, recapitulating the principle of natural selection.
Nevertheless, it is clear that both MaRS∗ and IP0 are interesting strategies that go beyond
memory-one dynamics, and that adjustments to the operating rules of both (such as consid-
erations for noise in the MaRS∗ decision rules and optimization of the infogain phase of IP0)
may result in a further convergence of the outcomes for the two strategies for the prisoner’s
dilemma in the contexts tested here. Both MaRS∗ and IP0 are likely to exhibit interesting
behaviors for asymmetric and higher-dimensional games as the space of strategies beyond
memory-one strategies is explored.
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Simulations. Evolutionary simulations were performed using either the Moran process
or the imitation dynamic with selection strength σ = 1 as in [18]. Unless otherwise stated,
all simulations were performed with a total population size of N = 100 starting with a single
player of the invading type and run until fixation of either the resident or invading type, and
the donation game score matrix (2, -1, 3, 0) as in [18].
In most cases, Nsim = 10, 000 independent simulations were run for each (invader, resident)
pair, and p-values for the observed number of successful invasions k were computed under a
null hypothesis H0 assuming a neutral rate of fixation θ = 1/N :
p> = p(K ≥ k|H0, θ = 1/N) =
Nsim∑
K=k
(
Nsim
K
)
θK(1− θ)Nsim−K
Following [14] and [18], we focus on memory-1 strategies with probability vector
p = (p1, p2, p3, p4) = (Pr(C|CC), P r(C|CD), P r(C|DC), P r(C|DD)).
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Unless otherwise specified in the text, we used the standard probability vector specified
in [18] for ZDR (with κ = 2, χ = 1
2
, φ = 0.1), and ZDχ (with κ = 0, χ =
1
2
, φ = 0.1).
4.2. Information Player Implementation. We implemented a basic information player
strategy, called IP0, with the following components: (1) an infogain phase during which an
IP0 player chooses its moves to maximize its information yield about a new player, both
to assess whether it is another IP0 (self vs. non-self), and in the latter case to estimate
its strategy vector; (2) a groupmax phase during which the IP seeks to maximize its score
relative to the opponent group, by either cooperating (if the other player is also using ip)
or using its current optimal strategy versus the group (if the other player is not an IP).
Note that when multiple IP0 players are present in a population, they operate completely
independently; they do not share information or communicate.
4.3. Basic definitions. IP0 records the outcomes of its games vs. a given player in terms
of (nAB, mAB) pairs, where A is a possible move (C or D) by itself, B is a possible move by
the other player (C or D), nAB is the total number of times game outcome AB has occurred
with this player, and mAB is the number of those cases where the other player’s next move
was C. Treating each such case as a binomial event with probability pAB = θ (probability of
cooperating given game outcome AB), the posterior distribution is p(θ|nAB, mAB) = β(mAB+
1, nAB − mAB + 1) (i.e. the Beta distribution assuming a uniform prior p(θ) = 1), the
maximum likelihood estimator is θˆ = mAB/nAB, and the posterior expectation value is
θ = E(θ|nAB, mAB) = (mAB +1)/(nAB +2). We use the symbol p = (θCC , θCD, θDC , θDD) to
refer to such an infered probability vector.
4.4. Infogain phase. For the first 10 rounds of its play with another player, IP0 chooses its
moves to seek game outcomes AB about which it has the least information (smallest number
of counts nAB). Specifically, if the current game outcome was ab, then it chooses the move
A that minimizes the expectation value of nAB:
Ainfogain = argmin
A
E(nAB|ab) = argmin
A
∑
B
p(B|ab)nAB
where p(B|ab) = (mab + 1)/(nab + 2) for B = C. In the case of exact ties (equal expectation
values for A = C,D), the IP0 breaks the tie by computing the MD5 hash value of the game
outcomes history string (e.g. “CCDC...”), and choosing C if its least-significant bit is zero,
otherwise D. Note that since this rule depends only on information known to both players
(their game outcomes), IP0 can predict what moves the other player would choose if it too
were an IP0. (Of course, in the presence of noise ǫ, the confidence of this prediction drops
to 1− ǫ).
4.5. Groupmax phase. During this phase, IP0 seeks to maximize its average relative score
vs. the opposing group G (equation 1). Each IP0 seeks to maximize SII (average score versus
other IP0 players by cooperating with any player it believes to be an IP. With all other
players, it applies its current groupmax probability vector pgroupmax chosen to maximize the
difference between the second (SIG) and third (SGI) terms above (see below for details).
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4.6. Tag inference. After each game, IP0 computes the likelihood odds ratio for the ob-
served move B of the other player assuming either that it is also an IP0, or that is a member
of the opponent group (GP). This is used to update the total log-odds ratio for that player:
L′ = L+ log
p(B|IP0, ǫ)
p(B|GP)
where L is the current log-odds ratio, L′ is the new log-odds ratio, and ǫ is the error rate
(frequency at which a player’s moves are flipped).
During infogain phase, the move expected from an IP0 player is predicted by the infogain
model. During groupmax phase, it is predicted by a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [15]
consisting of just two states: ALLC (“the other IP0 recognizes me as an IP0, and hence
cooperates with me”); and pgroupmax (“the other IP0 believes I am not IP0, and hence applies
pgroupmax against me”). The HMM permits a transition between either of these states with
1% probability per round. At the beginning of groupmax phase, the prior probability of
the ALLC state is simply set to the current posterior probability that the other player will
classify me as an IP, specifically p(ALLC) = 1/(e−L + 1), where L is the log-odds ratio the
other player would compute from my moves.
The conditional probability p(B|GP) is computed according to p, the current inferred
strategy of the opponent. If IP0 has not yet confidently identified any players as GP (see
below for details), then this p is derived solely from the IP player’s game outcomes with this
specific player. Otherwise, p is computed from game outcomes vs. all GP players that it has
confidently identified. This assumes that all non-IP0 opponents use the same strategy and
could be relaxed for games with more than two types.
During infogain phase, an IP0 player classifies another player as confidently GP, based on
the p-value of its history of moves under the null hypothesis that it is an IP0 playing infogain
moves:
p(E ≥ e|n, ǫ) =
n∑
E=e
(
n
E
)
ǫE(1− ǫ)n−E ≤ α
where n is the number of games it has played vs. that player, e is the number of observed
mismatches vs. the expected infogain move (during those games), E is the associated random
variable, and ǫ is the error rate. We used α = 0.01, for at most one expected false positive (in
a population of at most 100 IP0). During groupmax phase, an IP player classifies each player
according to its current log-odds ratio: as an IP0 if L > 0, otherwise as a GP. Finally, it
estimates the total number of IPs currently in the population from its posterior expectation
value:
m = 1 +
∑
i
p(IP0|Li) = 1 +
∑
i
1
e−Li + 1
where Li is its log-odds ratio for the hypothesis that player i is IP0 vs. is a GP (the one
additional count is for the IP0 player itself). When the IP detects birth of a new player, it
initializes the new player’s prior log-odds ratio to L = log m
N
. When it detects the death of a
player, if it was confidently a GP (L < logα), that player’s outcome counts (nAB, mAB) are
saved for inclusion in future computations of the GP strategy vector p.
4.7. Groupmax strategy optimization. If an IP0 is in groupmax phase with at least
one player, it computes an optimal strategy to use against the opposing group, based on its
estimate of the total number of IP0 (m) and its estimate of the opponent group’s strategy
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vector (p). It does this based on seeking the strategy pgroupmax that maximizes the interaction
terms of the relative score:
(2) pgroupmax = argmax
q
[
N −m
N − 1
S(q, p)−
m
N − 1
S(p, q)
]
where S(p, q) is the theoretical long-term score for strategy vector p when playing against
strategy vector q. We compute S(p, q) as previously described by [14]. Briefly, a game
between any two players is a Markov chain with states as pairs of plays in each round
{CC,CD,DC,DD}. The chain has a unique stationary distribution s, and the mean of
any four-vector f = (f1, f2, f3, f4) with the stationary distribution for two players p and q is
given by the Press and Dyson determinant [14]
(3) D(p, q, f) = det
[
−1+p1q1 −1+p1 −1+q1 f1
p2q3 −1+p2 q3 f2
p3q2 p3 −1+q2 f3
p4q4 p4 q4 f4
]
when f gives the scores that player p would receive for outcomes (CC, CD, DC, DD) respec-
tively. Using this expression, IP0 simply searches the 4-dimensional strategy vector space by
gradient descent for the p that maximizes the relative score vs. the opponent strategy p.
Our implementation of IP0 and the simulation code used for this manuscript is available
at https://github.com/cjlee112/latude.
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